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As computing technology becomes more pervasive and
broadband services are deployed into residential commu-
nities, new applications will emerge for the home and
community environment. These applications will assist
people in a variety of daily activities by enabling them
to create, access, and manipulate information about the
residents and resources in their homes. In a connected
community, resources in the home and information about
the residents of the home will be remotely accessible to
both residents and guests, as well as to potentially ma-
licious users. These new applications, as well as their
users and environment, pose new security challenges. The
challenges stem from two factors: the nature of the home
itself—a private space with a wealth of personal and sen-
sitive information—and the limited technical knowledge
and capabilities of the home’s residents.
We are addressing the problem of securing applications
that will access and control information resources in the
home of the future. Specifically, we are designing a secu-
rity system based on a paradigm called Generalized Role-
Based Access Control (GRBAC). GRBAC is an extension
of traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). It en-
hances traditional RBAC by incorporating the notion of
object roles and environment roles, with the traditional no-
tion of subject roles. These new types of roles allow one
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to define rich, easy-to-understand security policies with-
out having significant technical knowledge of the under-
lying computer systems that implement those policies. In
this paper, we motivate the need for GRBAC, provide a
high-level description of it and demonstrate its usefulness
and flexibility via several example applications.
1 Introduction
As computers become more common in the home and
broadband technology is introduced into residential com-
munities, new applications will allow a wide range of hu-
man activities (e.g., education, entertainment, social and
community gatherings, etc.) to be conducted over the In-
ternet. Such applications often will use information about
the residents of homes, as well as various resources in-
side the home. Furthermore, these applications will ac-
cess this sensitive information from many different loca-
tions. Therefore, the protection of private information
about each home’s resources and residents is a critical
concern that must be addressed before such applications
can be successfully deployed. For an “always connected”
home, in which the residents may have very limited com-
puter skills, this is clearly a challenging task.
From a security perspective, the home is a novel environ-
ment for exploring policies that are intended to control
access to sensitive resources and data. We expect many
future homes to feature a rich computation and commu-
nication infrastructure that includes a variety of sensors,
such as video cameras and audio microphones. The in-
formation gathered by these sensors may be used to fa-
cilitate rich social interactions via the Internet. The sen-
sors will record, manipulate and store information about
the home’s residents and their activities. Clearly, such in-
formation is private and must be protected from unautho-
Generalized Role-Based Access Control for Securing Future Applications
rized access. Traditionally, homes have been secured by
physical devices (e.g., burglar alarms, dead-bolts, motion-
activated lighting systems, etc.) that make it difficult for
intruders to gain access into the home. But in the near fu-
ture, when homes have networked information appliances
that are accessible via the Internet and so-called “intrud-
ers” can enter the home digitally, these physical mecha-
nisms will offer little or no protection to from these “vir-
tual” attacks.
Leaving homes vulnerable to electronic “trespassers” is a
legitimate concern that must be addressed before security-
sensitive applications can be deployed. Clearly, any com-
promise of the system entails the possibilities of data theft
and mass distribution of private information. Unlike a
physical burglar, an electronic intruder can attack the home
at any time, from any location. Data such as tax or medi-
cal records, the whereabouts of family members, and even
the hours of the day during which the home is unoccupied,
are sensitive and private, and should be protected with at
least the same level of security as any physical security
devices can provide.
At our research institution, we are building a prototype
“home of the future” that will be used to explore a variety
of new applications. These applications range from re-
mote control of appliances in the home (e.g., Cyberfridge
[9]) to awareness and monitoring of each resident’s activ-
ities and needs. For example, researchers are exploring
how a “smart” home can help elderly residents by moni-
toring their medical condition. The prototype home will
have a rich computation and communication infrastruc-
ture and will be connected to other homes and institutions
in the community. A variety of sensors will be used to in-
fer the activities of the home’s residents, and various ap-
plications will use this information to help improve their
quality of life. This experimental home provides an ex-
cellent context in which to explore the security needs of
future applications and the system support necessary to
secure them.
Although considerable work has been done in securing
military and commercial information systems, few projects
have specifically addressed the needs of a residential com-
puting infrastructure. We are developing security tech-
niques that can be used in the home and community en-
vironments. More precisely, we are exploring access con-
trol models and security policies that can be used to se-
cure next-generation home applications easily and intu-
itively. Our access control model is called Generalized
Role-Based Access Control (GRBAC). GRBAC builds upon
traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [4, 13]
with two new concepts: object roles and environment roles.
This extension unifies ideas from several existing access
control models into one elegant model that captures all
security-relevant state in a system. The unification of all
relevant state into a single concept—that of a role—makes
access control policies significantly easier to define and
implement in GRBAC than in other models. Ease of secu-
rity policy definition and implementation is a key require-
ment for emerging applications in the home and commu-
nity, since residents in the typical home are not experts in
either computers or security.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: in Sec-
tion 2, we briefly describe the Aware Home project and
the applications being explored there within. Then, in
Section 3, we discuss the security challenges presented
by this environment. To meet these challenges, we have
developed the GRBAC model, which we describe in Sec-
tion 4. In Section 5, we present examples of several ap-
plications and show how GRBAC can be used to specify
their security needs. We discuss related work in Section 6,
and we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 The Aware Home
The Aware Home project at our research institution is the
creation of an interdisciplinary team of researchers who
wanted to build an information-rich “home of the future”
from the ground up [7]. When completed, this home will
have a rich computation and communication infrastruc-
ture, including a variety of sensors and cameras that will
make the home “aware” of its residents and their activities
[10]. Various applications will exploit this “awareness” to
make daily living easier for the home’s residents. The new
applications that will be explored in the Aware Home re-
late to the domains of education, entertainment, physical
security, inventory management (e.g., for the contents of
the pantry or refrigerator), and utility management (e.g.,
for gas and electricity), as well as applications that permit
rich interactions with people and institutions outside the
home.
Consider some specific examples of Aware Home appli-
cations. One research group is exploring how the Aware
Home concept can help elderly residents remain in their
homes longer, rather than having to move into assisted
living communities. This application uses the home’s sen-
sors to enable important interactions with relatives outside
of the home and with care specialists, effectively provid-
ing the same level of care and supervision that today can
be found only in nursing homes and hospitals. Another
class of applications will allow residents to manage in-
ventories in the home from any location, inside or outside
the home. For example, the Cyberfridge application [9]
collects information about food items in a refrigerator and
makes the data accessible from anywhere. Cyberfridge
Covington, Moyer, and Ahamad 2
Generalized Role-Based Access Control for Securing Future Applications
can interface with a local food delivery service to auto-
matically reorder food items such as milk or eggs when
necessary. A third example is an application that auto-
matically manages home resources such as hot water and
heat, based on the residents’ preferences and daily living
habits. It can, for example, choose to heat the house only
when it knows there are residents inside, and it can choose
to produce hot water only at times when residents usually
take showers or wash clothing. Such an application can
even negotiate the best possible electricity rates with util-
ity services, based on the needs and preferences of the
home’s residents.
All of the applications described above share a common
thread: they are possible as a result of the Aware Home’s
ability to gather, store and transmit useful information
about the state of its resources and occupants. Clearly, this
information should be available only to legitimate users
and applications. Financial loss, public embarrassment
and even physical harm are just a few of the many po-
tential negative consequences of a breach in the security
of any of these applications. Therefore, from a security
standpoint, the Aware Home project presents a unique op-
portunity to explore the support that is necessary to se-
cure the home of the future, before the technology—and
the risk that accompanies it—become widely available.




The Aware Home applications described in the previous
section present new and interesting security challenges.
First, the residents of a home usually know little about in-
formation security or computer technology. Despite their
lack of expertise, however, they often will need to con-
figure and manage information security policies in their
homes. Therefore, system usability is critical. In short,
the system must make it very easy for a homeowner to de-
fine and manage security policies for the applications and
resources in the home; otherwise, it is likely the home-
owner will not use the security features of the system at
all. This requirement encompasses all aspects of usabil-
ity, including learnability and the generation of appropri-
ate feedback to assure the user that she is using the system
correctly. Second, the system must not intrude upon the
everyday activities of residents in the home. For exam-
ple, it is unreasonable to expect a resident to explicitly
authenticate herself to the home security system before
opening the refrigerator. Essentially, the security mech-
anisms must be both usable and non-intrusive, or many
homeowners will simply avoid using them. In the remain-
der of this section, we explore these requirements in more
detail.
Security policies in the Aware Home potentially can be
quite complex, as we will demonstrate via the following
examples. A policy can constrain access to information
or resources based on several factors, including attributes
about the subject, the resource or the environment. For ex-
ample, subjects can be classified as “resident” or “guest,”
“adult” or “child,” or even as a “pet.” Access rights then
can depend on the subject’s attributes (e.g., “resident”), as
well as on his or her identity. Access also may be con-
strained based on the subject’s location, or based on en-
vironmental factors such as the temperature or the time
of day. For example, a policy might say that a repair-
man has access to the refrigerator only while he is inside
the home on January 17, 2000, between 8:00 a.m. and
1:00 p.m. In addition, access to information objects or
resources may depend on security-relevant attributes of
the object’s state. For example, a child may be prohib-
ited from viewing any television program or movie that is
not rated “G” or “PG”. As a final example, both positive
and negative access rights arise naturally in the context of
the home. For example, adult residents may be granted
access to all appliances in the home, while children are
denied access to potentially dangerous appliances. Given
these simple examples, it is easy to understand how any
access control system for the home must be both flexi-
ble and easy to use. In subsequent sections of this paper,
we will describe why we believe that the GRBAC access
model fulfills these requirements.
Another challenge presented by the home environment is
relieving the user from the burden of access control de-
cisions. Ideally, information available from sensors in
the home should be used to automatically infer a sub-
ject’s security-relevant attributes (e.g., identity, role or lo-
cation.) For example, several technologies such as voice
and face recognition are being deployed in the Aware Home
to non-intrusively identify humans and track their move-
ments. Many such techniques can establish the identity
of a subject with only a partial level of certainty, or con-
fidence level. Such “partial authentication” has impor-
tant implications for access control models. In particular,
some identification mechanisms are known to be more re-
liable than others. For example, an experiment might con-
clude that face recognition is 90% accurate, while voice
recognition is only 70% accurate. This introduces a po-
tential problem regarding the identification of subjects in
the home. If one type of sensor can identify a subject with
a higher degree of accuracy than another, then the sys-
tem should permit the definition of security policies that
account for the difference in accuracy. For example, con-
sider an adult who wants to view the output of a video
Covington, Moyer, and Ahamad 3
Generalized Role-Based Access Control for Securing Future Applications
camera in a child’s bedroom, for the purpose of checking
on the child. The security policy may state that only the
child’s parents or babysitter can view the video. Perhaps
a “strong” identification mechanism may provide enough
authentication evidence to allow the user to see a stream-
ing video, while a “weak” identification mechanism may
provide only enough authentication evidence to permit the
user to view a recent still image of reduced quality and
definition. A security model for the home should incor-
porate these confidence levels for both authentication and
access control. In the following section, we introduce GR-




In the previous section, we discussed some of the chal-
lenges facing a security system for an Aware Home envi-
ronment. We are designing a system that we believe will
meet these challenges. At the core of this system is our
Generalized Role Based Access Control (GRBAC) model.
GRBAC is an extension of traditional Role Based Ac-
cess Control (RBAC) that uniformly applies the concept
of roles not only to subjects, but also to objects and sys-
tem states. In this section we introduce GRBAC. First, we
review the most important features of traditional RBAC.
Then, we discuss the fundamental concepts of GRBAC
and describe some of the important issues relating to it.
4.1 Traditional RBAC:
A Foundation for GRBAC
Traditional Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [4, 13] is
a form of mandatory (i.e., centrally administered) access
control. It is based on the premise that most real-world
access control decisions are determined by a person’s po-
sition or job title within an organization. Accordingly, the
purpose of RBAC is to encourage the design of security
policies that closely mirror the structure of organizations.
In this section, we highlight the most important features
of the traditional RBAC model.
4.1.1 RBAC: Basic Features and Rules
The basis of RBAC is the concept of a role. Fundamen-
tally, a role is a grouping mechanism that is used to cate-
gorize subjects based on various properties. Much of the
RBAC model is based on the mathematics of set theory;
thus, many of the constructs of the RBAC model are based
on the notion of set membership. Individual users in an
RBAC system are called subjects. Each subject has an
authorized role set, which consists of all the roles that the
subject has been authorized to use. We use the term role
possession to denote that a role is in the authorized role
set of a subject. In other words, we say that subject 
possesses role  if  has been authorized to use  .
The other two fundamental concepts in RBAC are the ob-
ject and the transaction. An object is any resource in a
system. Example resources in the home include appli-
ances such as a dishwasher or stereo, media objects such
as movies, and sensitive digital information such as medi-
cal records or income tax returns. A transaction is a series
of one or more accesses to a set of one or more objects. A
transaction in the home could be as simple as reading file
foo on the family computer. In contrast, a transaction in
a military setting can be as complex as aiming and firing a
missile from a Navy destroyer. All policy rules in RBAC
are linked to roles, rather than to individual subjects. For-
mally, each role  is associated with an authorized trans-
actions set; this is the set of transactions that a subject may
perform using role  . Therefore, for a subject  to gain
access to transaction  ,  must demonstrate possession of
a role  , for which  is in the authorized transactions set
of  . Figure 1 summarizes the basic RBAC features.
4.1.2 RBAC: Some Problems and Solutions
At its core, RBAC is quite simple; however, in practice,
RBAC policies can become very complex and unwieldy.
In this section, we describe some of the problems that
RBAC systems face, as well as several advanced RBAC
features that have been used to solve the problems. We
first examine two problems that stem from the complexity
of policies: separation of duty and role precedence. Then
we discuss role activation and role hierarchies, two con-
structs that can help mitigate these problems.
Separation of Duty It is implicit from the previous sec-
tion that a subject can possess multiple roles simultane-
ously. Typically, there are no problems associated with
multiple role possession; however, there are some cases
in which the set of access privileges granted by multiple
role possession can constitute a conflict of interest. For
example, in a financial institution, two possible roles are
teller and account holder. An account holder authorizes
certain actions (such as withdrawals and deposits) on his
account, and a teller executes those actions. If a person
is a bank employee and also owns a checking account at
the bank, there exists the potential for that person to act
as both an account holder and a teller at the same time.
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Definitions:
Subject  a user of the system
Role  a categorization primitive for subjects
Object 	 a system resource
Transaction 
 a series of one or more accesses to one or more objects  the authorized role set for subject   the authorized transaction set for role 
exec 
 true iff subject  is authorized to execute transaction 

RBAC Access Mediation Rule:
exec 
 true iff  role  :    , 
  
Figure 1: Basic RBAC Definitions and Rules
With the privileges of both account holder and teller, an
employee may be able to perform illegal actions, such as
making fraudulent deposits, on his account.
Such scenarios occur often in RBAC systems; the circum-
stance described above is known as a separation of duty
problem. There are two varieties of separation of duty:
static and dynamic. Dynamic separation of duty occurs
when two roles present a conflict of interest if a subject
uses them both at the same time. The conflict of interest
described above is an instance of dynamic separation of
duty. Note that there is no conflict of interest if the em-
ployee acts as a teller during one time interval and an ac-
count holder during another interval, since only when he
assumes both roles simultaneously is it possible for him
to abuse the system. In contrast, static separation of duty
occurs when two roles present a conflict of interest that
cannot be resolved by simply preventing the roles from
being used simultaneously. In these cases, the two roles
may never be used by the same subject. If roles R1 and R2
exhibit static separation of duty, and subject S has acted in
role R1, he may never act in role R2.
Role Precedence Another problem that relates to mul-
tiple role possession is role precedence. Role precedence
stems from inconsistent access rules between two roles
that a subject possesses. For example, in the home envi-
ronment, suppose that user Bobby is authorized to possess
the roles of child and family member. Suppose also that
the family member role is authorized to read family medi-
cal records, but the child role is not. If Bobby tries to read
the family’s medical records, the system must decide how
to resolve the inconsistency in the access policy. To solve
the problem, the system must decide which access rule
takes precedence over the other. There are many ways to
make this decision. The simplest way would be to always
give precedence to the role that denies access. Similarly,
the system could always give precedence to the role that
allows access. Or there could be some other predefined
rule or algorithm established to decide role precedence.
One approach to solving this problem, as we discuss be-
low, is the use of role activation. Role precedence is a
problem that every RBAC system must solve.
Role Activation We discussed above the concept of an
authorized role set: the set of roles that a subject is al-
lowed to use. The problems of separation of duty and role
precedence both are related to an authorized role set, be-
cause as the size of an authorized role set grows, separa-
tion of duty and role precedence become more difficult to
manage. One of the most common and effective ways to
handle this problem is to restrict a subject’s role usage to
a subset of his authorized role set at all times, so that only
those roles that are necessary to perform his current duties
are active. This is called role activation. When role acti-
vation is used, a subject must declare which roles he in-
tends to use at all times. The roles that have been declared
active constitute the subject’s active role set. Only roles
in the active role set can be used to execute transactions.
This mechanism allows the system to more easily enforce
dynamic separation of duty constraints: the system sim-
ply disallows any two roles with dynamic separation of
duty constraints from being active at the same time. Role
activation also provides a natural mechanism for resolv-
ing role precedence: in case of a conflict between roles,
active roles take precedence over inactive roles.
Role Hierarchies Another useful RBAC construct is the
role hierarchy. Role hierarchies can help manage role
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complexity through structure to exploit commonality not
only among subjects but among roles as well. For exam-
ple, in an organization all managers may have a certain
set of core “management privileges” even though they all
work in different departments. This commonality can be
exploited through a role hierarchy that makes each de-
partment manager role a sub-role of a generic “managers”
role. Role hierarchies allow a policy implementor to write
generic access rules just once, rather than once for every
role to which the rules apply. This kind of structuring tool
can help avoid policy “bugs”: cases in which the policy
implementor has incorrectly written the policy. Hierar-
chies also can serve as a tool for cleaner policy design,
thereby eliminating some cases in which role precedence
conflicts might otherwise have occurred.
4.2 The GRBAC Model
Traditional RBAC is very useful, but it suffers from subject-
centric limitations that restrict the policy designer to a
subject-oriented viewpoint. Generalized Role Based Ac-
cess Control (GRBAC) is an extension of RBAC that re-
moves the subject-centric limitation, allowing a policy de-
signer to write the policy from a subject-centric, object-
centric, or environment-centric viewpoint, or whatever com-
bination of these is most appropriate for the circumstances.
GRBAC removes the limitations of RBAC by using the
basic concept of a role to organize all entities in a system.
It exploits the organizational power of roles for grouping
environment states and objects, in addition to subjects.
This section introduces our GRBAC model at an informal
level. Interested readers are encouraged to consult [11]
for a more formal treatment of the GRBAC model.
4.2.1 Subject Roles
A subject role in GRBAC is analogous to a traditional
RBAC role. Each subject is authorized to assume a set of
subject roles. Subject roles may be hierarchical or “flat”
(single-level) in nature. The system may also use subject
role activation. The only difference between GRBAC sub-
ject roles and traditional RBAC roles is the way that they
are used to make access decisions. In traditional RBAC,
an access decision is based entirely on the permissions as-
sociated with the set of roles that the subject possesses. In
GRBAC, an access decision depends not only on subject
roles, but also on environment roles and object roles. We
describe each of these roles below.
4.2.2 Environment Roles
There are many real-world instances in which access con-
trol depends not only on the person making the access
and the object being accessed, but also on the state of the
environment during the access. For example, many or-
ganizations restrict access to their facilities during nights
and weekends. In the military, secure computer systems
are often restricted only to personnel in designated phys-
ical areas, such as a highly secure computer room. In the
home, parents might restrict their children’s access to the
television, allowing the kids to watch TV only after they
have done their homework, and only until 9:00 p.m. In
each of these instances, the access control policy depends
on information from the environment. The two most basic
types of environmental information are time and location,
but any security-relevant information in the environment
that can be accurately captured by the system also can be
used to restrict access to system resources.
The GRBAC model allows policy designers to specify
system state through environment roles. An environment
role can be based on any system state that the system can
accurately collect. For example, we can define a role
corresponding to each day of the week, or each month
of the year. A policy rule such as “managers may edit
salary data for their employees only on the first Monday
of each month” is easy to implement using environment
roles. Similarly, environment roles may be used to de-
scribe rules that relate access permissions to the locations
of subjects. In the home, we can define location roles
such as “upstairs,” “downstairs,” “master bedroom,” etc.
We can then use these roles in policy rules; for example:
“children may only use the videophone while they are in
the kitchen.”
Relating to environment roles, there clearly are many tan-
gential issues that must be addressed before environment
roles can be used in real access control systems. First and
foremost, the system must be able to securely and accu-
rately collect enough system data (e.g., an accurate esti-
mate of the current time, or the location of a subject in the
home) to determine whether a given environment role is
active. One effective approach to this problem would be
to use a trusted event system that is capable of generating
events based on various system state changes. Second, the
system must provide a means for policy implementors to
define roles. Some basic environment interface must ex-
ist, so that policy writers can associate their environment
role definitions with actual system states. Both of these
issues are the subject of ongoing research and are beyond
the scope of this paper.
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4.2.3 Object Roles
Subject roles and environment roles allow a policy imple-
mentor to structure a policy based on either the properties
of the subjects in the system, or the system state itself. But
what if the policy implementor wants to structure the pol-
icy according to the properties of the resources in the sys-
tem? To accommodate this scenario, the GRBAC model
also includes object roles. Object roles allow us to cap-
ture various commonalities among the objects in a sys-
tem, and use these commonalities to classify the objects
into roles. Object roles can be based on any classifiable
property of an object, including its date of creation, object
type (image, source code, streaming video, etc.), sensitiv-
ity level (secret, top secret, etc.), or information about the
contents of the object (for example, we could classify ob-
jects based on whether they contain any content related to
Microsoft Corporation). After classifying the objects, we
can make access control decisions based on the classifica-
tion scheme that we created.
4.2.4 Making Access Decisions with GRBAC
In Figure 1, we outline the basic algorithm for mediat-
ing access to objects in the traditional RBAC model. In
RBAC, if subject  wants to access object  ,  must pos-
sess a role  that is authorized to execute transaction  ,
such that  can access  . In GRBAC, the access me-
diation algorithm is similar, but slightly more complex.
Subject  possesses a set of subject roles, and object 
possesses a set of object roles. In addition, the system
keeps track of a set of environment roles. For  to access
 ,  must possess some subject role   , such that:
1.  some object role "! , possessed by  ;
2.  some environment role $# that is currently ac-
tive;
3.  some transaction  that allows   to access "!
when  # is active.
Clearly, this access mediation rule is more complex than
the corresponding rule for traditional RBAC.
In Section 4.1.2, we briefly discussed separation of duty
and role precedence, two of the potential problems that
can arise in an RBAC system. These two problems are
not confined to traditional RBAC; they also can cause dif-
ficulty in the GRBAC model. In fact, GRBAC’s generality
makes it even more susceptible to various types of policy
conflicts and ambiguities. Our purpose in this paper is not
to outline all of these potential problems, but simply to
introduce the reader to the fundamental GRBAC concepts
of subject roles, object roles and environment roles. We
do not discuss the GRBAC model in any more detail here;
however, we encourage interested readers to refer to [11]
for a more thorough review of the model, its usage, and
the problems that can arise from it.
5 GRBAC in Practice
GRBAC is a powerful and elegant model for specifying
access control rules in a computationally rich environ-
ment. This section shows how GRBAC can be applied
in practice to the home environment. It also illustrates
some of the additional security benefits that GRBAC can
provide in a system.
5.1 A Simple Example
To illustrate the power and elegance of GRBAC, we begin
by creating a subject role hierarchy, such as the one dis-
played in figure 2. This role hierarchy presents a graphical
view of the sample household that we will consider in the
following scenario. Specifically, it shows the relationships
that exist between the various users and the roles that are
present in the system. The figure shows that users Mom
and Dad have each been assigned to the Parent role. In
addition, users Alice and Bobby have been assigned to the
Child role. The system also can accommodate an autho-
rized household guest, Dishwasher Repair Technician.
Assume that Mom and Dad have decided to permit the
children to use entertainment devices (such as the tele-
vision and VCR) on weekdays, but only during their free
time after dinner, before going to bed. To enforce this pol-
icy, the system must be configured to identify the various
entities in the system and classify them into the particular
roles that are relevant to the access decision being pro-
cessed.
In this particular example, the system must use all three
types of GRBAC roles. First, the users must be classified
so that a specific user identity can be mapped to a role,
such as Parent or Child. By mapping users to roles, the
home administrator can specify an access control policy
for a group of users, rather than for each individual user.
If the access policy requires the administrator to classify
a subset of users from both the Parent and Child roles,
he can simply create a new role and map users into it as
necessary.
In addition to subject roles, the system in this example
uses an environment role named weekdays. Weekdays are
defined by the system as the time from 12:01 a.m. on
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Figure 2: An Example Subject Role Hierarchy for the Home
Monday to 11:59 p.m. on Friday. Also, since dinner usu-
ally is over by 7:00 p.m., and since the children have a
bed time of 10:00 p.m., the environment role free time is
defined to be 7:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.
Finally, the system has a defined object role named enter-
tainment devices. Objects that map to this role include all
televisions, stereos and home video games. If the house-
hold were to purchase a new toy or entertainment device,
they could simply map the device to the role and it would
immediately be controlled by this pre-defined access pol-
icy.
After defining all the necessary roles, the administrator
needs to write just one rule to implement the policy. The
rule in this case is “any child can use entertainment de-
vices on weekdays during free time.” This example shows
how GRBAC makes it easy to take a fairly complex ac-
cess policy and implement it cleanly and efficiently using
subject, object, and environment roles.
5.2 Enhancing a System
with GRBAC
The scenario above presents some sample GRBAC roles
and illustrates how role relationships can be used to es-
tablish security policies for the home. As stressed ear-
lier, ease of security policy definition and implementation
is a key requirement for applications in this domain, be-
cause we cannot require all homeowners to fully under-
stand information security. In addition, we have stated
that the system and related security mechanisms must be
non-intrusive and easy to use. In this section, we briefly
explore how GRBAC can be used to enhance a system and
also fulfill these requirements.
As discussed in Section 3, a system should make access
decisions without placing any undue burden on the users.
Unfortunately, access control without authentication is usu-
ally impossible. In the home, it is generally unacceptable
to require users to explicitly “log in” before using a de-
vice or service. Instead, they should be identified implic-
itly by sensors throughout the home. These identification
technologies are not perfect, however, and often may pro-
vide only “partial authentication” of users based on lim-
ited sensory information. Fortunately, GRBAC makes it
possible in many cases to make access decisions based on
only partial authentication information.
Consider the following scenario. Suppose that Alice is 11
years old and weighs 94 pounds. She has finished eating
her dinner, and she wants to watch television before going
to bed. As she approaches the television, the Smart Floor
[12] can identify her as Alice with 75% accuracy by com-
paring the amount of weight that it senses with its inter-
nal, “official” weight for Alice, 94 pounds. Suppose that
the security policy requires a person to be identified with
90% accuracy before the system will grant rights to that
person. Based on this policy, Alice should not be allowed
to access any resources, because the system has received
insufficient data to authenticate her at the required 90%
level. But given the structure of a GRBAC security pol-
icy, the system is not limited to making access decisions
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based only on a specific user’s identity. The policy spec-
ifies that anyone in the Child role can use entertainment
devices (an object role possessed by the television) dur-
ing free time. Despite the fact that the Smart Floor is able
to identify Alice with only 75% accuracy, it may be able
to authenticate her into the Child role with 98% accuracy,
because it knows (for example) the approximate weight
of children in the household. Since the system can au-
thenticate Alice into the Child role with higher than 90%
accuracy, and there is a policy rule stating that children
can use entertainment devices during free time on week-
days, it will grant her access to the TV when she pushes
the TV power button.
6 Related Work
In this section, we briefly highlight several existing ac-
cess models and compare them to GRBAC. We discuss
traditional RBAC, time-based authorization, system-load-
based authorization, content-based access control, and sev-
eral other notable models. GRBAC allows us to express
policies supported by these other models, and it also pro-
vides an elegant means of unifying all of their major con-
cepts.
We discussed traditional RBAC [4, 13] in Section 4. Tra-
ditional RBAC is essentially GRBAC with subject roles
only. The GRBAC model is more versatile and more ex-
pressive than traditional RBAC because it uses not only
subject roles, but environment roles and object roles as
well. GRBAC clearly is a more complex model than RBAC,
but we believe that with appropriate care for “clean” (i.e.,
well-structured) policy definition and the right set of con-
structs for creating “clean” policies, the additional expres-
sive power provided by GRBAC justifies its additional
complexity.
Bertino et al. [2, 3] have investigated support for temporal
authorizations in database systems. They have examined
both periodic and non-periodic authorizations. Their ac-
cess control model is discretionary, whereas GRBAC is
mandatory. But in principle, their notion of temporal au-
thorization is similar to GRBAC’s notion of time-based
environment roles. We believe our model is superior to
theirs in terms of its usability and flexibility. In GRBAC,
environment roles can be used to simplify temporal ac-
cess rules by assigning human-understandable names to
various periods of time, e.g., “Monday,” “Weekends,” or
even “Weekday mornings in July.” In contrast, their au-
thorization language is very technical, which inherently
limits its usefulness to the small set of people who have
the background necessary to understand it.
Similarly, in their Generalized Access Control Language
(GACL), Woo and Lam [15] use the notion of system load
as a determining factor in certain access control scenar-
ios, so that, for example, certain programs only can be
executed when there is enough system capacity available
to handle them adequately. Given appropriate support for
monitoring and reporting changes in system state, the GR-
BAC model can also support such state-based authoriza-
tion decisions using environment roles. In fact, the scope
of GRBAC environment roles is limited only by the level
of support that the system provides for accurately report-
ing environmental information.
Gopal and Manber [6] discuss how to integrate content-
based access mechanisms into traditional file systems. Their
work is based on Gifford’s Semantic File System [5]. GR-
BAC also supports a form of content-based access control
using object roles; however GRBAC differs slightly from
their model in its focus. Specifically, they focus on the
systems issues involved in efficiently integrating hierar-
chical file systems with database-like query functionality.
In contrast, GRBAC focuses on elegance, clarity of con-
cept, and usability.
There are several other access control models that are worth
noting due to their influence on the design of GRBAC;
we briefly mention them here. The first related model
is multilevel access control [1], which traditionally has
been used in military computer systems for highly sen-
sitive data. Its basic premise is to allow information to
flow up the chain of security levels, but never down. The
GRBAC model can be used to implement multilevel ac-
cess control, but the converse is not true. Another related
access control model was proposed by Jajodia et al. [8].
It seeks to separate access policy from access mechanism
by providing the policy designer with a language that is
provably capable of expressing any access policy. Finally,
we note the work of Shen and Dewan [14]. They have
developed a flexible, powerful role-based model for ac-
cess control in collaborative environments, where policies
must account for concurrent operations on shared objects
and other complex access issues.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a new access control
model, Generalized Role-Based Access Control (GRBAC),
and described why we believe it will be useful for secur-
ing applications in the highly-connected homes of tomor-
row, as well as in other environments. The major benefit
of GRBAC over current access control models is its com-
bination of usability and expressiveness. GRBAC is easy
to use because it is based on one main concept: the role;
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however, the uniformity and flexibility with which roles
are applied to subjects, objects and environment states
also makes the model very powerful and expressive. It
is important to note that GRBAC is not a complete secu-
rity solution in itself. It is only an access control model;
to be useful in the real world, it must be integrated care-
fully into a trusted computer system. In the near future,
we intend to explore these integration issues and build a
prototype system based on GRBAC.
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